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ABSTRACT. The impacts of coca cultivation and coca eradication on rates of humid tropical forest
clearance were examined in the agricultural colonization zone of Chapare, Bolivia. Using satellite image-
derived land-use maps, interviews with farmers, and analyses of economic data and policy documents,
forest clearance rates were analyzed in three contrasting communities from 1963 to 2003. Deforestation
rates were very low from the late 1970s to the early 1990s when coca cultivation was widespread and anti-
coca policies were weakly enforced. Before and after this period, deforestation rates were significantly
higher. This study provides the first detailed quantitative analysis of deforestation rates under different
policy regimes in a coca source region. It provides weak support for the argument that labor constraints
lead to a reduction in forest clearance rates during periods of coca cultivation advanced by Kaimowitz
(1997); but stronger support for Henkel’s (1995) hypothesis that farmers would clear large areas of forest
after abandoning coca to maintain household incomes. However, economic arguments based on household
data alone are inadequate in explaining forest clearance in this region, and a political ecological approach
that analyses economic drivers in a policy framework provides better explains deforestation dynamics.
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INTRODUCTION
Lowland tropical forests along the eastern margins
of the Andes (the Tropical Andes biodiversity
hotspot: Myers 1988, 2003, Myers et al. 2000) have
witnessed waves of migrants during the late 20th 
Century who have converted forest to cropland and
pasture. Aided by a plethora of policy initiatives,
they are fragmenting lowland humid and lower
montane tropical forests; threatening habitat
integrity; compromising ecosystem services; and
impacting their own livelihoods and those of
indigenous people. These phenomena have been
mapped in Colombia (Viña et al. 2004, Etter et al.
2006), Ecuador (Walsh et al. 2003, Pan et al. 2004),
Peru (Naughton–Treves 2004), and Bolivia
(Steininger et al. 2002, Millington et al. 2003, van
Gils and Loza Armand Ugon 2007).
Since the late 1970s, an important income source
for many colonists has been coca—Erythroxylum
novogranatense (D. Morris) Hieron. var.
novogranatense in Colombia (MacGregor 1993,
Fjeldså et al. 2005) and Erythroxylum coca Lam.
var. coca in Bolivia (South 1977, Sanabria 2004)
and Peru (Young 2004). Traditionally coca leaves
have been chewed in the Andes (Commission of
Enquiry on the Coca Leaf 1949, Meruvia 2000), but
they are also the base ingredient for cocaine paste
(MacGregor 1993). Since the 1970s, rising demand
for cocaine in the developed world (Walsh 2004)
has maintained high prices for coca relative to other
crops, making it a lucrative cash crop. Perceived
negative social impacts of coca chewing stimulated
the UN Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf
in the 1940s (Commission of Enquiry on the Coca
Leaf 1949). High levels of cocaine production and
trafficking in South America by the late 1950s
prompted the Interamerican Conference on the
Illicit Traffic in Cocaine and Coca Leaves in 1960
and subsequent legislation (Parreiras 1961).
Continued production and trafficking (Joseph
Rowntree Foundation 2000, Steinberg et al. 2004)
forced the U.S. government to initiate the “War on
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Drugs” and the enforcement of anti-coca policies
during the 1980s and 1990s (McCoy 2004), which
included uprooting and burning bushes, spraying
defoliants, and introducing alternative development
programs that promote substitute crops. Amazon
deforestation caused by ranching and crop
cultivation have been described and modeled
elsewhere (e.g., Moran et al. 1994, McCracken et
al. 1999, Mäki et al. 2002, Walker 2004); however,
in the presence of illegal coca, agents and drivers of
deforestation are also influenced by coca
cultivation, cocaine processing, and policies
designed to counteract coca-related activities
(Bradley and Millington 2008). Social and political
issues related to coca have generated much research,
but little attention has been paid to environmental
impacts. These include deforestation, forest
fragmentation, encroachment onto conservation
units, soil erosion, and point pollution of soil and
water (Dourojeanni 1992, MacGregor 1993, Young
1996). The enforcement of anti-coca policies further
degrades environments in coca-source regions, e.g.,
defoliants contaminate soil (MacGregor 1993),
streams, and groundwater.
Kaimowitz (1997) theorized that deforestation rates
would be low under coca-dominated production
systems because of the high labor requirements
needed to maintain more than a hectare of coca
bushes. Henkel (1995) presented a theoretical,
economic argument based on calculations of
cultivated areas in Chapare. He argued that without
coca cultivation only 20% of farmers could be
supported on the 114 000 ha of land cleared by 1990,
and to support the remaining four-fifths, 700 000 ha
of forest would have to be cleared. This equated to
an average expansion of each farm from a few to 20
ha. To our knowledge, no detailed, quantitative
analysis of deforestation rates under coca
production and anti-coca policy regimes has been
published.
STUDY AREA
The Chapare colonization zone covers approximately
24 500 km2 of central Bolivia (Fig. 1) and, after parts
of Colombia and Peru, it is the third largest coca-
source region globally United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2006). Elevation ranges
from 200–500 m.a.s.l. and, before colonization, it
comprised terra firma and inundated lowland forests
on alluvial fans and seasonally inundated
floodplains (Montes de Oca 1989). The region is
connected by road to the second (Santa Cruz) and
third (Cochabamba) largest urban areas in Bolivia:
both are major markets for Chapare’s produce. The
Andes, to the south, are covered with species-rich,
tropical montane forests containing high levels of
endemism. Chapare forms a transition zone between
biologically important Andean montane forests and
the Amazonian humid tropical lowland forests to
the north (Myers 1988, Myers et al. 2000, Navarro
et al. 2004), and biological interchange between the
two is compromised by development in Chapare.
Colonization began in 1910 at Todos Santos in
central Chapare. The first government-sponsored
schemes were initiated in the same area a decade
later (Lavandez 1925, Weil 1983). Until the 1960s,
colonization was generally unsuccessful (Mather
1922, Crist 1946, Weeks 1946, Edelmann 1967,
Fifer 1967, Weil 1983). However, during the 1960s,
several hundred communities and some large-scale
commercial ventures were established in central
Chapare under Plan Decinal. They caused forest
destruction that has been attributed to farmers
inexperienced in humid tropical environments and
weak government support (Rivera 1990). Driven by
national shortages of potatoes and maize, colonists
invested in rice, leading to rapid deforestation (Weil
and Weil 1983). By the 1970s, fruit cultivation and
ranching were commonplace. At this time, coca,
which grows well in Chapare and is easy to transport
as dried leaves, had become popular, although
Rodriguez (1965) noted it was cultivated in the late
1950s and early 1960s. During the 1980s,
colonization shifted to eastern Chapare along a new
road linking Cochabamba and Santa Cruz
(Millington et al. 2003). Improvements in transport
infrastructure should have favored the growth of
marketable, perishable crops, but coca continued to
dominate because of the high prices created by
strong global demand for cocaine (Bostwick et al.
1990). Coca production became so prevalent that
the United States forced the Bolivian government
to implement anti-narcotics policies (Sanabria
2004). To comply with U.S. policies, the Bolivian
government set coca-field destruction targets that
were accompanied by increasingly aggressive
eradication campaigns conducted by the Bolivian
police and military during the 1980s and 1990s
(Morales 2004) (Table 1). Law 1008 (Ley del
Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas) in
1988 recognized legal cultivation in traditional
coca-growing areas in subtropical valleys of the
Andes and made cultivation in the Chapare
lowlands illegal. Subsequent anti-coca packages
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Fig. 1. Chapare: location map.
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included alternative development programs built
around crop substitution programs supported by U.
S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
marketing campaigns and subsidies (Table 2). Many
substitute crops failed to reward farmers adequately
because of: (i) lower economic returns than those
from coca; (ii) poorly researched markets; (iii)
markets that became oversaturated and crashed
(Hellin 2001); and (iv) lower economic returns for
substitute crops than anticipated because of
middlemen-dominated transport networks and
wholesale markets. These factors undermined
confidence in substitute programs generally
(Jackson et al. 2003), and in spice and palm heart
cultivation specifically (Hellin 2001). Returning to
coca was a common response.
METHODS
We used similar methods to Rindfuss et al. (2003).
They included a time series of satellite images,
household and farm surveys, and analyses of
archived cadastral surveys, agricultural statistics,
and economic data. Our time frame was 1963 to
2003. We selected three distinctly different
communities in central and eastern Chapare that
were colonized at different times (Table 3) for
detailed analysis. Each represents one of the main
types of agricultural activity in the zone. Their
names have been changed to Communities I, II, and
III, which also refers to the chronological order of
settlement.
Land use and forest conversion were mapped from
a time series of Corona, Landsat MSS, TM and
ETM+ satellite images. Corona data are
panchromatic high spatial resolution declassified U.
S. spy satellite photographs acquired between 1959
and 1980, which have begun to be used to extend
land-change studies backward into the 1960s
(Hamandawana et al. 2007, Tappan et al. 2000). We
used Corona KH4A data acquired on 23 September
1966 (ground resolution ≈3 m) for Community I.
Cloud-free Landsat data for Communities I and III
(Path/Row 232/72) were acquired on 1 July 1976,
4 October 1986, 18 July 1993, 18 February 1996,
and 14 July 2000; and for Community II (Path/Row
231/72) on 16 September 1975, 25 July 1986, 9 July
1992, 5 August 1996, and 5 June 2000. We geo-
rectified the images (RMS <0.3 pixels) and mapped
10 land-cover classes using the ISODATA
clustering algorithm in Erdas Imagine (Bradley
2005). We masked water bodies and shadow, and
excluded them from the analysis. We used
information obtained during field verification
campaigns and interviews with farmers to allocate
each cluster class to either a forest or a non-forest
class for each image in the series. When we could
not resolve a cluster class on the basis of this
information, or contextually, it was allocated to
forest. A forest/non-forest map was created for each
year in the image sequences. Because we allocated
ambiguous land covers to the forest class, forest
clearance metrics are conservative and deforestation
rates may be slightly underestimated. We digitized
cadastral plans for each community and overlaid
them on the forest/non-forest maps. We calculated
forest and non-forest areas from each image map,
and the proportions of forest remaining in ArcGIS.
Rates of forest loss were calculated for inter-image
periods using the following equation:
rj = (CAk1j – CAk2j ) / (k1 – k2)
where r = rate of clearance, CA = cleared area, j =
community and k = time point. Rates of forest
clearance are assumed constant between image
dates.
We conducted household surveys in each
community in 2000 and 2003. These focused on past
and current land uses, with forest/non-forest maps
being used as prompts. Cultivating coca in Chapare
is clandestine, and talking to farmers about it is
challenging. Therefore, we did not broach the
subject until we had gained their confidence. It is
too risky to enter farms without an invitation or an
escort, so only if a farmer agreed did we walk their
farms with them. Even then, we did not make
detailed maps of coca cultivation using GPS during
field visits as this would have jeopardized our
research. Rather, they drew sketch maps of their past
and current land uses, recording locations of specific
crops and agroforestry complexes. We compared
the sketch maps with the forest/non-forest maps to
verify past forest cover and land use, i.e., to convert
them to land-use maps. Some cropped areas were
clear on the imagery, but others were less so because
they were intercropped or overgrown.
We interviewed 14 of 110, 16 of 90, and 13 of 60
households in Communities I, II, and III,
respectively, to provide information pertinent to
Kaimowitz’s (1997) labor argument. Using
interview data and land-use maps, we created
chronologies of dominant farming activities for
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Table 1. Main periods during which military action was used to enforce anti-coca policies (sources: Cardozo
et al. 1999, Ortuño 2002, Jackson et al. 2003)
Year(s) Policy instrument Enforcement action
1981 Law 18265
Law 18741
Option of compensation when coca crop forfeited, otherwise forced removal of coca
crop when discovered
1986 Operation blast
furnace
Military strike unit targets localized areas to destabilize local economies based on
coca.
1986–1989 Plan Trienial Intense military action to eradicate coca—abandoned after 12 months due to civil
unrest.
1988 Law 1008 Legalization of 12 000 ha of coca for cultural purposes—mainly in the Yungas of La
Paz. Coca bushes in the remaining areas to be removed within 8 years.
1998–2003 Plan Dignidad Five-year plan to remove all illegal coca—this target was claimed to be met in 2000.
each community (Fig. 2). We divided the 43 farms
researched into six forest clearance typologies (e.g.,
Figs. 3 and 4), which were based on analyses of the
trajectories of farming activities obtained from
interviews and farm walks, and then identified the
rates of clearance associated with each typology to
define them in terms of land-use trajectories and
rates of forest loss.
We obtained economic data from USAID. These
are discontinuous as a result of short-term program
funding, and are only available for the last two
decades. Data from the Chapare Regional
Development Project (CORDEP; 1993–1996) is for
wholesale prices of substitute crops in the major
cities. Price data on alternative crops (2001–2003)
from the Counter-Narcotics Consolidation of
Alternative Development (CONCADE) program
were collected at truck checkpoints on the borders
of Chapare. We also obtained data on farmgate
prices during interviews, and time-series of coca
prices and areas of under coca cultivation from the
Bolivian National Statistics Institute (INE) and the
UNODC. These data were used to contextualize
trends in dominant farming activities and forest
clearance rates, and test Henkel’s (1995) ideas on
comparative prices and clearance.
RESULTS
Forest areas and rates of forest clearance are shown
in Fig. 2. Complete forest cover in Community I in
1963 had declined to 33% by 1986, although it had
recovered to 44.8% by 2000. In Community II,
forest cover declined from complete cover before
colonization (1972) to 42.8% by 2000. Over the
same time, forest cover in Community III fell from
complete cover to 53%.
Table 4 shows the proportion of farmers interviewed
undertaking the main commercially oriented
farming activities (banana, citrus, and coca
cultivation, and ranching) in each community in
relation to clearance statistics. In Community I,
which was founded as part of a government-
sponsored settlement program in 1963, interviews
indicate that subsistence dominated during the first
3 years, supporting Henkel’s (1987) and Rivera’s
(1990) observations. Cultivation of rice (for
subsistence and sale), a series of failed crops in the
1960s and 1970s, and coca in the late 1970s
increased forest clearance rates (Weil and Weil
1983). Interviews indicate that at least half the
farmers had cultivated bananas since the mid 1970s.
This had increased to approximately three-quarters
by 2003. Coca cultivation gradually increased, and
the greatest proportion of farmers (28.6%)
cultivated it during the mid 1990s. In the early
1990s, the clearance rates decreased as coca
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Table 2. Duration and aims of alternative development programs used as part of anti-coca policies (sources:
Bostwick et al. 1990, Ortuño 2002, Jackson et al. 2003). CDRP = Cochabamaba Regional Development
Program; CORDEP = Chapare Regional Development Project; CONCADE = Counter-Narcotics
Consolidation of Alternative Development Program.
Years Project Aims
1984–1987 CDRP Research and development into alternative crops to coca. Creation of micro regions
around growth poles.
1987–1990 CDRP (amended) Concentrated resources into Chapare region, involved crop substitution and research
and development into over 40 substitute crops.
1991–1999 CORDEP Marketing and subsidizing of a few specific coca alternatives, e.g., palm hearts,
bananas, and pineapples (determined from the results of CRDP), coined “economy
substitution.”
1999–2004 CONCADE Support for Plan Dignidad, aimed at encouraging alternatives and stabilize
alternative markets to coca bushes as they were eradicated.
cultivation increased and farmers often abandoned
other crops to maintain coca. Substitute crops
increased as coca fields were eradicated and farmers
were exposed to USAID substitute crop programs.
Accordingly, there were increases in banana and
citrus cultivation as farmers abandoned coca:
between 1997 and 2000, forest clearance rates
decreased further.
Most farmers in Community II settled in 1983 to
form a cattle cooperative (Table 3), nonetheless
between 1981 and 1995, a high proportion (34%–
62%) grew coca. That proportion fell, and by 2000,
when only 12% admitted cultivating it, most (94%)
were clearing forest for pasture. Rates of clearance
were highest immediately after the two periods of
settlement, in 1972 (due to rice cultivation) and 1983
(due to subsistence crops, coca, and pasture). The
relationships between the rates of forest clearance
and the proportion of farmers cultivating coca or
ranching are not clear; however, the greatest
increase in the mean cultivated area occurred
between 1987 and 1993 when an additional 44% of
farmers began to clear forest for pasture.
It is clear from the data in Table 4 that high rates of
forest clearance were prevalent in Community III
between 1983 and 1986 when farmers who had
recently moved there cleared forest to grow
subsistence crops and coca. After 1990, the
proportion of farmers engaged in coca decreased.
This was mirrored by an increase in the proportion
of farmers cultivating substitute crops, which in this
community were dominated by bananas. This
switch occurred because farmers were forced to find
alternatives to coca, and had joined USAID
substitute programs. The relationships between
forest clearance rates and periods of coca cultivation
and substitute crops are clearer in Community III
than in the other communities (Table 4).
In general, where coca was cultivated, forest
clearance rates tended to be low, but increased as
coca substitutes became dominant. Clearance rates
were normally high when cattle ranching was the
major activity. Some clearance typologies of the six
identified (Table 5) were more frequent that others,
e.g., in Community III, 76.9% of farms had
trajectory 4, coca to substitutes with slow to fast
clearance, and in Community II, 62.5% of ranches
were predominantly for cattle, with a period of coca
when forest was cleared more slowly.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of forest/non-forest maps combined
with interviews enabled contemporary and past land
uses to be established. We contextualized these by
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Table 3. Salient information concerning the three communities studied (adapted from Millington and
Bradley 2008). Note, in previous publications, the communities have been given the names of Caracas (I),
Bogotá (II), and Arequipa (III).
Community Area (ha) Altitude (m.
a.s.l.)
Number of
properties
Number and %
of farmers
interviewed
Year of
first settled
Prevailing economic activities
2000–2003
Community I 1745 220 110 14 (13%) 1963 Banana, mandarin, and orange
cultivation
Community II 3196 250–350 90 16 (18%) 1972 Ranching: beef and dairy
Community III 1220 250 60 13 (22%) 1983 Banana, black pepper,
cassava, heart of palm, and
rice cultivation
reference to the time-series of crop price data to
develop an understanding of the economic
rationales behind farmers’ decisions to clear forest
at different rates under coca and anti-coca regimes.
Coca prices between 1979 and 2002 are provided
in Fig. 5. Although coca prices were at their lowest
between the mid 1980s and the late 1990s, the
farmers we interviewed strongly argued that risks
associated with illegal coca cultivation during the
period of low prices were worth taking because coca
provided a better selling return than other crops. In
part this is because, regardless of price, coca can
provide three harvests a year in Chapare unlike most
other crops.
To help develop this economic argument further,
wholesale prices for pineapple, a major substitute
crop, between 1992 and 2003 are shown in Fig. 5.
The gaps in these data emphasize the difficulties in
acquiring data on crop production and prices in
Bolivia. Unlike coca, pineapple only provides one
crop a year. The investments in pineapple are worse
still compared with coca because the first harvest is
delayed until 2 years after planting, after which
fields are converted to other land uses. Pineapple
prices also have a well-developed seasonal trend
unlike coca, which maintains a more-or-less
consistent price throughout the year. Peak prices for
pineapple declined significantly between the mid
1990s and 2000–2003. It is thought that this was the
result of market controls through subsidies.
Subsidies also led to stabilization of banana prices
between 2000 and 2003 compared with the mid
1990s (Fig. 5) when, although prices increased, their
behavior was spiky. Compared with pineapples and
bananas, a major advantage that stable coca prices
gave farmers, even when coca prices were low, was
a predictable, assured household income. We argue
this led to the development of risk-adverse behavior
amongst farmers, which made them reluctant to take
risks with substitute crops later unless they could be
assured of a secure market or a crop subsidy. The
strongly advantageous selling returns of substitute
crops reinforced this risk-adverse mentality.
These economic arguments are highly pertinent to
our consideration of deforestation rates under coca
and anti-coca regimes. In the theoretical example
provided in Table 6 it is clear that the high economic
returns of coca would not only strongly influence a
farmer’s decision to grow coca, but would impact
on the amounts of forest that would need to be
cleared to grow coca or a substitute crop. In the
example, 14 ha of palm need to be grown to produce
palm hearts equal in monetary value to a hectare of
coca. These data strongly indicate that farmers
would generally choose to cultivate coca over
substitute crops because of its higher selling return
and its relative stability compared with the unstable
prices and markets for most substitute crops.
However, this has not been the case all the time in
Chapare. The economic arguments above generally
only apply when Chapare was under a coca regime,
Ecology and Society 13(1): 31
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art31/
Fig. 2. Inter-image forest clearance rates (histograms) in ha/yr and proportions of forest remaining (line
graphs) for Community I (top), Community II (middle), and Community III (bottom) between 1963 and
2000. The dominant land management tendencies are given for each community: HTF–humid tropical
forest (no cultivation); Sb–subsistence; C–coca; AD–alternative development programs (substitute
crops); R–rice; P–pasture; F–fruit.
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Fig. 3. A sequence of land-use maps illustrating a farm from Community III where conventional crops
were grown throughout the period investigated.
i.e., periods when coca prices were high and/or coca
eradication was weakly enforced. It is at these times
that deforestation rates have been low: mean forest
losses on the farms we have studied have varied
from negative values indicating forest regrowth to
losses of around 0.4 ha/yr. The economic arguments
do not apply to the periods we term anti-coca
regimes, times when the implementation of anti-
narcotics policies have overcome the economic
imperatives of coca growing and forest conversion
rates increased rapidly (mean forest clearance rates
on farms range from 0.9–1.1 ha/yr). Therefore,
although Kaimowitz’s (1997) and Henkel’s (1995)
economic arguments have some value in explaining
deforestation rates in Chapare, they underplay the
importance of policy shifts.
The impacts of changing policies on the areas of
coca cultivated and eradicated, and substitute crops
grown between 1980 and 2000, are shown in Fig.
6. Two communities—I and II—were settled before
1980, the approximate date when the global cocaine
market became serviced by coca leaves from
Chapare and the area cultivated increased markedly.
Our evidence indicates that either rice or fruit were
cultivated by farmers before 1980 and that relatively
little coca was grown. The policy that drove land
use in the 1960s was the Plan Decinal, but weak
markets and a poor infrastructure led farmers to
begin cultivating coca in large quantities from the
late 1970s onward because of its comparative
economic advantage and lack of government
controls on its cultivation. During the 1980s, the
existing farmed areas in Communities I and II, and
the newly cleared areas in Community III, were
dominated by coca. Eventually policies to counter
the illicit coca trade were triggered (Tables 1 and
2). Despite moves to discourage cultivation between
Ecology and Society 13(1): 31
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art31/
Fig. 4. A sequence of land-use maps illustrating a farm from Community I where coca was grown and
then abandoned in favor of substitute crops.
the mid 1980s and 1991, data in Fig. 6 clearly show
that for the remainder of the 1980s coca was
dominant and the area under substitute crops only
increased slowly. This trend is mirrored in the
deforestation dynamics of the communities we
researched. If the high rates of clearance for
subsistence cultivation are ignored, the mean rates
of forest conversion to agriculture across
communities were low when coca was the main
economic activity, e.g., Community I (-16.88 ha/yr)
and Community III (8.2 ha/yr). Community II
maintained high rates because it is a predominantly
cattle-rearing community, compared with field and
orchard crop cultivation in the other two
communities (Table 3), and clearance for pasture
generates high rates of forest conversion.
Implementation of anti-coca policies strengthened
significantly after 1986, and eventually the area
under substitute crop programs increased, e.g., from
60 000 to 120 000 ha between 1993 and 2000 (Fig.
6). These broad land-use trends apply to all three
communities. In Community I, fruit cultivation
again became important, and in Community III,
farmers began to cultivate bananas, black pepper,
palm hearts, passion fruit, and pineapples. The
responses are clearly evident in the mean
community forest clearance rates, which increased
to 30.98 ha/yr in Community I between 1993 and
1996, and 57.5 ha/yr in Community III after 1996.
The situation in Community II—the cattle-rearing
community—was different in that farmers had
continued to clear large areas of forest for pasture,
and during the implementation of anti-coca policies,
overall community clearance rates remained high at
over 100 ha/yr.
By combining the economic and policy data with
the analyses of deforestation dynamics at
community and farm levels between the 1960s and
2003, we have identifed three epochs of colonist
agriculture, each with a distinct deforestation
dynamic. Epoch I was characterized by the
cultivation of conventional tropical crops and is
mainly restricted to the decades before 1980.
Deforestation rates were high, particularly in the
initial few years when farmers were establishing
their farms. In Epoch II, which extends throughout
the 1980s and into the mid 1990s, land-conservative
coca dominated agricultural practices and forest
clearance rates plummeted. We call this the coca
regime. From the mid 1990s to the end of our survey,
Epoch III was characterized by the cultivation of
alternatives to coca. During this time, land-hungry
substitute crops necessitated the clearance of much
forest and forest losses increased. This we term the
anti-coca regime.
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Table 4. Proportion of interviewed farmers cultivating bananas, citrus, and coca, or ranching in the three
communities investigated; and forest clearance statistics for all land parcels in the same communities.
Interview data have been aggregated in 5-year intervals and related to the inter-image statistics. un = denotes
uncertain data due to less reliable recall by farmers interviewed.
Major activities
(% of interviewees)
Average clearance rates
(ha yr-1)
Coca Banana Citrus Community Plot SD
Community Time Satellite imageinterval
Average plot
area
I 1960–1965 Un Un Un
1966–1970 Un Un Un 1963–1966 83.40 1.13 0.47 3.38
1971–1975 Un Un Un
1976–1980 0.00 50.00 0.00 1966–1975 63.92 0.71 0.40 9.88
1981–1985 0.00 57.14 7.14 1975–1986 43.46 0.48 0.36 14.55
1986–1990 21.43 50.00 14.29 1987–1993 -16.88 -0.2 0.36 12.18
1991–1995 28.57 50.00 14.29 1994–1996 30.98 0.32 0.54 13.12
1996–2000 21.43 57.14 35.71 1997–2000 -44.32 -0.45 0.63 11.33
2001–2003 7.14 78.57 71.43 ? ? ?
II Coca Pasture
1971–1975 Un Un 1972–1975 17.68 2.53 1.53 12.56
1976–1980 Un Un 1976–1983 1.24 0.18 0.27 13.82
1981–1985 37.50 6.25 1983–1986 167.57 1.86 1.34 6.29
1986–1990 62.50 50.00 1987–1993 108.41 1.19 0.76 13.45
1991–1995 31.25 75.00 1994–1996 111.65 1.21 1.11 18.32
1996–2000 18.75 93.75 1997–2000 39.83 0.47 1.42 20.21
2001–2003 12.50 93.75 ? ?
Coca Banana
III 1981–1985 23.08 0.00 1983–1986 58.8 0.93 0.49 2.80
1986–1990 84.62 23.08 1987–1993 8.20 0.14 0.21 3.80
1991–1995 61.54 53.85 1994–1996 34.71 0.55 0.39 5.48
1996–2000 38.46 84.62 1997–2000 57.50 0.92 0.52 9.16
2001–2003 38.46 92.31 ? ? ?
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Table 5. Forest clearance typologies.
Trajectory Description of land-use change and relative clearance rates Proportion of farms (as %) following this
trajectory in Community:
I† II III
1 Coca cultivated throughout period researched; slow clearance 0 6.3 7.7
2 Coca never cultivated, other crops cultivated; fast clearance
[illustrated in Fig. 3]
57.2 0 15.4
3 Coca never cultivated, dominated by a rice–pasture rotation;
fast clearance
14.3 31.2 0
4 Coca cultivated, then abandoned in favor of substitute crops:
slow clearance replaced by fast clearance [illustrated in Fig. 4]
21.4 0 76.9
5 Predominantly ranching, but coca cultivated for part of period
researched, then abandoned in favor of ranching; generally fast
clearance
0 62.5 0
6 Commerical and subsistence cultivation prior to a period
dominated by coca cultivation, after which coca abandoned in
favor of substitute crops;: slow clearance during the coca
period, fast clearance at other times
7.1 0 0
†We suggest that the low proportion of farmers admitting to growing coca is under-reported in
Community I for two reasons. First, closer proximity to the main military base for narcotics control
(Chimore) than the other two communities may have increased the farmers’ sensitivity to coca growing
—even in the past. Second, the presence our field assistant may have inhibited farmers because, even
though he lives in the city of Cochabamba, he was known to people in this community through a church
exchange.
Having, for the first time, quantified rates of forest
conversion under coca and anti-coca regimes, it is
possible to revisit the arguments postulated by
Kaimowitz (1997) and Henkel (1995) about
deforestation under both regimes. In terms of the
household labor constraint argument, we have
evidence from the sequences of forest/non-forest
maps for individual farms contextualized with
interview data. In the few areas where farmers
continued to grow coca in the face of anti-coca
policies (Trajectory 1, 5), labor was directed toward
coca and little was available to clear forest. Forest
clearance rates on such farms were very low. More
common is the property illustrated in Fig. 4, which
is owned by a farmer who volunteered to give up
coca and grow substitutes. Growing these proved to
have lower labor requirements than tending coca
bushes, and forest was cleared faster. Although the
two examples lend some quantitative support to
Kaimowitz’s (1997) argument, it is difficult to
evade the economic arguments that probably also
prevailed in these two households. His argument is
further weakened by evidence from Community II,
the community where coca was always secondary
to cattle. Here, long-term decisions were made to
channel household labor into creating pasture so that
herd sizes could be increased. When coca was
cultivated in Epoch II, it was very much an income
supplement. Typical is trajectory 3 (Table 5), which
is restricted to farmers in Communities I and II who
had cattle. High rates of forest conversion were
maintained throughout Epoch II on these farms/
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Fig. 5. Price data for coca leaves (top), pineapple (middle), and bananas (bottom) traded in Chapare.
Data are from different sources, refer to text for details.
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Table 6. Comparison of the economic returns from coca and heart of palm (source: interview data, 2000)
Crop 2000 price (US$) Potential number of
harvests annually
Potential harvest Selling return per
hectare of crop (2000
prices), assuming three
harvests
Coca $98 per carga† 3 4 cargas/cato‡ US$ 2,352
Heart of plam $0.10 per unit 3 1500 units/ha US$ 150
† A carga is a colloquial term used for a 100-lb (45.4 kg) sack of dried coca leaves
‡ A cato is 1/6th (0.1.67) ha, making the potential coca harvest = 1088 kg/ha.
ranches because of the long-term goal of building
up herds. In Community I, the farm labor pool had
been fully occupied cultivating conventional crops
for almost two decades during Epoch I, during
which time forest clearance rates were high.
Clearance rates decreased in the mid to late 1980s
(Epoch II) because, although farmers grew
conventional crops as well as coca, most household
labor was diverted to coca cultivation. Labor
resources were too stretched to clear more forest,
but additionally our interviews indicate that
simultaneously other factors promoted the decline
in forest clearance rates. These were (i) that there
was little or no forest left to clear in some plots; (ii)
low yields had led farmers to abandon some crops
leading to forest regrowth; and (iii) some citrus
stands were maturing and appearing as forest
regrowth on image-derived forest/non-forest maps.
In places where farming activities were well-
established and/or farmers had developed long-term
strategies, e.g., in Communities I and II, we cannot
readily attribute changes in forest clearance rates to
household labor constraints created by the coca
economy. The explanations underpinning changes
in deforestation rates in such locales are more
complex. In Community III, however, where the
initial settlement coincided with the coca regime of
Epoch II, there is a stronger case that the clearance
rates were influenced by labor constraints.
The interviews provide strong support for Henkel’s
(1995) economic argument concerning forest
clearance. Most farmers unambiguously confirmed
that they had cleared more forest after they had given
up coca (Epoch III) to achieve acceptable economic
returns on investments in substitute crops and to
maintain household incomes. Small areas of coca
were grown during Epoch II, indicating that
households dependent on coca were conservative
deforesters. Enforcement of eradication and
promotion of substitutes led to more forest being
cleared, particularly among large families. In some
circumstances, the image interpretation confirmed
what the farmers suggested in interviews. For
example, in Community III, where there was
widespread replacement of coca with substitute
crops, average farm sizes have increased by about
7 ha (in plots no larger than 20 ha) in Epoch III. This
is much less than that predicted by Henkel, but we
note that many farmers were cultivating coca
alongside substitute crops until recently, and some
possibly continue to do so. For those who chose
substitutes over coca, the consumption of forest is
all too clear from image analysis and walking
through farms (Fig. 4). As already indicated, coca
cultivation in Community II had little impact on the
rate of forest-to-pasture conversion between Epochs
I and II and farms continued to expand by
approximately 1 ha/yr. In terms of Henkel’s (1995)
argument, the supplementary nature of coca in
Community II is pertinent, but its location is also
germane to the argument. Located in western
Chapare, it was the community farthest away from
the coca heartland of central Chapare. It is, perhaps,
better thought of as being at the periphery of the
well-established agricultural hinterland of Santa
Cruz. Consequently markets were better developed
and more stable, particularly for beef and dairy.
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Fig. 6. Areas of coca grown, coca eradicated, and substitute crops grown in Chapare, 1980–2000. The
zero value for the amount of coca grown in 2000 is most likely related to propaganda at the time, rather
than an actual value. (Sources: area of coca and substitute crops, Millington et al. 2003; eradication data,
UNODC 2004)
Although there is no documented meat price data
for Chapare, farmers recalled that cattle prices were
generally stable and rarely fluctuated through the
1980s and 1990s, eliminating one of the incentives
to invest in coca. Even when the economic drivers
encouraged farmers to cultivate coca elsewhere,
long-term economic objectives seem to have
prevailed in this community. In Community I, the
rice and fruit cultivation system established before
Epoch II never completely disappeared, even
though forest clearance rates fell as more coca was
cultivated. As a consequence, during Epoch III,
farmers often reverted to their pre-coca crops and
rates of clearance increased as either primary forest
or forest regrowth was cleared.
CONCLUSIONS
We have integrated land-use mapping, interviews
with farmers, and analyses of economic data and
policy documents in a longitudinal analysis of
deforestation dynamics in Chapare to quantify and
understand the effects of coca cultivation and anti-
coca regimes. Focussing on three communities has
enabled us to gain detailed insights into the
socioeconomic processes underpinning the deforestation
rates in three epochs: Epoch I before coca
cultivation became widespread in Chapare and
forest clearance was driven by the cultivation of
subsistence crops, rice or fruit and pasture creation;
Epoch II when coca cultivation was rampant; and
Epoch III when eradication was strenuously
enforced and substitute crop strategies promoted.
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The contrasting arguments of Kaimowitz (1997)—
that household labor constraints restrict forest losses
during periods of coca cultivation—and Henkel
(1995)—that the differences between economic
returns from coca and substitute crops lead
households to clear large amounts of forest after
abandoning coca—are both partially supported by
our findings. Low deforestation rates are typical of
a coca regime, but are not simply a function of labor
constraints. Farm incomes appear to have a strong
influence. After coca is abandoned, deforestation
rates increase. However, this is not a function of
simple comparative economics undertaken by
households. Complexities in household computations
include the stability of markets for the substitutes,
trends in farmgate prices, cropping patterns before
switching to coca, and their ability to grow coca
under conditions of enhanced surveillance.
The geography of place plays an important role in
determining deforestation rates and this may be true
for coca and anti-coca regimes in Chapare.
Community II’s relatively long distance from
Chapare’s coca heartland and its integration in a
relatively stable market for meat in Santa Cruz
meant that the effects of coca cultivation on
deforestation rates between the three epochs
outlined above were lower in Community II than in
Communities I and III. Variations in soil and
hydrological conditions have led to particular
substitute crops being promoted in the zones where
they grow best. Some communities prosper because
they are located in zones where the dominant
substitute crop they grow is also supported by stable
markets and good prices. For others it may be the
opposite, and they may return to coca. Deforestation
rates will respond to these geographical variations.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art31/responses/
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